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Many cooperative games, especially ones stemming from resource pooling in
queueing or inventory systems, are based on situations in which each player is as-
sociated with a single attribute (a real number representing, say, a demand) and in
which the cost to optimally serve any sum of attributes is described by an elastic func-
tion (which means that the per-demand cost is non-increasing in the total demand
served). For this class of situations, we introduce and analyze several cost allocation
rules: the proportional rule, the serial cost sharing rule, the benefit-proportional rule,
and various Shapley-esque rules. We study their appeal with regard to fairness cri-
teria such as coalitional rationality, benefit ordering, and relaxations thereof. After
showing the impossibility of combining coalitional rationality and benefit ordering,
we show for each of the cost allocation rules which fairness criteria it satisfies.
Keywords: Games/group decisions: cooperative, mathematics: convexity, inven-
tory/production: applications, queues: applications.
1 Introduction
Consider a set N of maintenance firms, each responsible for maintaining trains and railway
infrastructure in their own geographical region. Each firm i ∈ N faces a demand rate for
∗Corresponding author. E-mail address: f.j.p.karsten@tue.nl.
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resources (e.g., spare parts) of λi per year. Currently, the firms have separate resources, but
they could also set up a pool with shared resources to jointly serve the sum of their demand
rates. Either way, the total expected yearly operating costs for a pool that optimally serves
demand rate Λ in total is described by K(Λ). Of course, the precise shape of this function
K will depend on whether or not demand is stochastic, whether or not there are economies
of scale in the resupply process, and what happens in case of a shortage. What’s important
is that K is elastic, i.e., K(Λ)/Λ is non-increasing in Λ. Accordingly, there are economies
of scale that can motivate the firms to collaborate.
The situation described above is an example of what we will call an elastic single-
attribute situation. There are two key features. First, each player is associated with a
single attribute: a real number, which might represent, e.g., a demand rate. Second, the
costs for any group of players are described by a non-decreasing, elastic function that only
depends on the players’ attributes through their sum.
In recent years, several papers have appeared on resource pooling in canonical inven-
tory and queueing models. As pointed out by Özen et al. (2011), many of them fit the
framework of an elastic single-attribute situation. We mention EOQ inventory situations
(Meca et al., 2004), (S − 1, S) inventory situations (Karsten and Basten, 2014), M/M/s
queueing situations (Guo et al., 2013), and M/G/s/s queueing situations (Özen et al.,
2011; Karsten et al., 2014). They are described in more detail in Section 2.3. These mod-
els differ in the structure of the underlying cost function, but all belong to the class of
elastic single-attribute situations.
Before a resource pooling collaboration can take place in practice, there are several
issues to agree upon. A key problem is that of cost allocation: If all firms join forces, then
how can the total expected yearly costs K(
∑
i∈N λi) be divided amongst the participants
in a fair way? All of the above-mentioned papers provided insight into this question by
formulating and analyzing a cooperative game, and we will adhere to this approach in the
present paper as well. That is, we assume that any coalition M ⊆ N would face costs
K(
∑
i∈M λi) and study cost allocation rules within the context of the resulting game.
In the aforementioned papers, much attention has been paid to the proportional rule,
which assigns costs in proportion to the players’ attributes. (Although most of these papers
considered this rule on the limited domain of their specific situations, we will study the
obvious extension to the domain of elastic single-attribute situations.) The proportional
rule is easy to understand and easy to compute. Moreover, due to elasticity of K, it always
results in an allocation in the core of the associated cooperative game (as proven by Özen
et al., 2011). This is a nice property that ensures that no subset of players has an incentive
to split off and act separately. However, we show that under the proportional rule, a player
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with a lower attribute may reap more benefits (defined as the costs a player would incur
when acting alone minus the cost assignment when collaborating with everyone) than a
player with a larger attribute. We view this as a downside because larger players, who
contribute more, may feel like they don’t receive a fair share of the benefits.
With this downside in mind, we set out to find an alternative allocation rule that
always accomplishes core allocations and always gives larger benefits to players with larger
attributes. This, however, turned out to be impossible: there is no rule on the class of
elastic single-attribute situations that satisfies both requirements simultaneously.
Not to be oudone, we relax our fairness properties to weaker versions, and show that
those are compatible. Subsequently, we introduce four new allocation rules on elastic single-
attribute situations and evaluate their performance with respect to (the relaxations of) core
inclusion and benefit ordering. The first rule is essentially the serial cost sharing rule of
Moulin and Shenker (1992) but now applied to elastic single-attribute situations. The
second rule is a variation on the proportional rule that allocates the benefits, rather than
the costs, proportional to the players’ attributes. The third and fourth rule are inspired
by the seminal works of Shapley (1953, 1971) and are based on marginal allocations for
adjusted situations in which the elastic function is approximated by a concave function as
close as possible. The difference between these two so-called concavicated marginal rules
lies in the set of marginal allocations that are being averaged.
In contrast to the proportional rule, our four newly proposed rules explicitly take into
account the specific shape of the cost function. For each rule, we show which fairness
properties it does and which it does not satisfy, as summarized in Table 4 on page 30. The
concavicated marginal rules in particular are appealing because they always accomplish
core allocations and, in contrast to the proportional rule, they are guaranteed to give
larger players more benefits whenever the cost function is concave.
On the whole, this paper provides the first overview of cost allocation rules and their
properties on the domain of elastic single-attribute situations. The organization is as
follows. We start in Section 2 with preliminaries on cooperative game theory, elasticity, and
elastic single-attribute situations. Section 3 presents our impossibility result that benefit
ordering and core inclusion are not compatible in general. Subsequently, we introduce and
analyze several new allocation rules: Section 4 considers the serial rule, Section 5 considers
the benefit-proportional rule, and Section 6 considers the concavicated marginal rules. We
conclude in Section 7.
3
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce several concepts from cooperative game theory that are
relevant to our work. Subsequently, we define and characterize elasticity. Finally, we
introduce elastic single-attribute situations and their associated games, and we provide
several examples from the operations research literature.
2.1 Cooperative games and the Shapley value
A cooperative cost game with transferable utility, which we will simply refer to as a game,
is a pair (N, c), where N is the non-empty finite set of players and c : 2N → R is the
characteristic cost function, which assigns to every coalition M ⊆ N the cost c(M) that
it would face if cooperation would be limited to only the players in M . By convention,
c(∅) = 0. A game is called concave if any player’s marginal cost contribution does not
increase when joining a larger coalition, i.e., c(M ∪ {i})− c(M) ≥ c(L∪ {i})− c(L) for all
i ∈ N and all M,L ⊆ N \ {i} with M ⊆ L.
A central problem in cooperative game theory is how to allocate c(N), the costs of the
grand coalition N , to the individual players. An allocation for a game (N, c) is a vector
x ∈ RN satisfying
∑
i∈N xi = c(N). The value xi is then interpreted as the costs assigned
to player i. An allocation x for a game (N, c) is called individually rational if every player
is allocated no more costs than what he would face by staying alone, i.e., xi ≤ c({i}) for
all i ∈ N . The set of all individually rational allocations for a game (N, c) is called the
imputation set, denoted by I(N, c). By extending individual rationality to all coalitions,
we obtain coalitional rationality: an allocation x for a game (N, c) is called coalitionally
rational if
∑
i∈M xi ≤ c(M) for all M ⊆ N . The set of all coalitionally rational allocations
for a game (N, c) is called the core, denoted by C(N, c).
One well-known cost allocation rule is the Shapley value (Shapley, 1953). To describe
it, we first need to define orderings and marginal allocations. An ordering on player
set N is a bijection σ : N → {1, . . . , n}, which should be interpreted as saying that
player i is in position σ(i). We let Π(N) denote the set of all orderings on N . For an
ordering σ ∈ Π(N), we let σ−1(j) denote the player that is in position j ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}
and we let P σi = {j ∈ N |σ(j) < σ(i)} describe the set of players that precede i. The
marginal contribution of player i according to σ in a game (N, c) is given by mσi (N, c) =
c(P σi ∪{i})−c(P σi ), i.e., the cost difference when player i joins his predecessors. The vector





i (N, c) = c(N).
4







mσi (N, c) for all i ∈ N .




(|M |)!(|N | − |M | − 1)!
|N |!
· [c(M ∪ {i})− c(M)] for all i ∈ N .
Following Shapley (1971), if a game (N, c) is concave, then mσ(N, c) ∈ C(N, c) for any
σ ∈ Π(N) and Φ(N, c) ∈ C(N, c). Note that as every marginal allocation is efficient, so is
their average.
2.2 Elastic functions
Elasticity is a way of capturing economies of scale.1
Definition 2.1. A function f : R+ → R+ is called elastic if f(0) = 0 and f(x1)/x1 ≥
f(x2)/x2 for all x1, x2 ∈ R++ with x1 ≤ x2.
Intuitively, if f(x) expresses the cost of, say, serving demand level x, then elasticity of
f says that the per-demand cost is non-increasing in the total demand served. The name
“elasticity” is based on the economics literature, as motivated by Özen et al. (2011, p.
386).
The following example shows that an elastic function can be built up from convex
segments, which is also the case for the elastic functions underlying the Erlang loss games
and spare parts games that will be described in Examples 2.3 and 2.5.
Example 2.1. Consider the function f : R+ → R+ defined by
f(x) =

5x if x ∈ [0, 1];
x2 + 4 if x ∈ (1, 2];
0.5x2 + 6 if x ∈ (2, 3].
10.5 if x > 3;
This function is elastic because f(0) = 0 and because f(x)/x, which is equal to 5 if
x ∈ [0, 1), equal to x + 4/x if x ∈ (1, 2], equal to 0.5x + 6/x if x ∈ (2, 3], and equal to
10.5/x if x > 3, is non-increasing for x > 0. ♦
1We write R+ = [0,∞) and R++ = (0,∞).
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The next example of an elastic function will form the basis for the impossibility result
of Section 3.
Example 2.2. Consider the function f : R+ → R+ defined by
f(x) =

0 if x = 0;
5 if x ∈ (0, 5];
x if x > 5.
This function is elastic because f(0) = 0 and because f(x)/x, which is equal to 5/x if
x ∈ [0, 5) and equal to 1 if x ≥ 5, is non-increasing for x > 0. ♦
The following proposition characterizes an elastic function as a function f for which
any straight line segment drawn through a point (a, f(a)) on its graph and the origin lies
completely below or on the graph of f . This has a clear link to concavity. We omit the
obvious proof.
Proposition 2.1. Consider any function f : R+ → R+ with f(0) = 0.
(i) The function f is elastic if and only if f(x) ≥ f(a)x/a for all a ∈ R++ and all x ∈ (0, a].
(ii) If f is concave, then f is elastic.
As shown by Examples 2.1 and 2.2, the converse of Part (ii) of this theorem is not true.
We next state a continuity property.
Proposition 2.2. Let f : R+ → R+ be a non-decreasing, elastic function. Then f is
continuous on R++.
Proof. Let a ∈ R++ and let ε > 0. If f(a) > 0, then fix δ = min{a, εa/[2f(a)]}; otherwise,
if f(a) = 0, then fix δ = a. Let x ∈ (a− δ, a+ δ). If x < a, then





≤ ε/2 < ε,
where the first inequality holds because f is non-decreasing and the second inequality holds
by Part (i) of Proposition 2.1. Similarly, if x ≥ a, then
|f(a)− f(x)| = f(x)− f(a) ≤ f(a+ δ)− f(a) ≤ f(a)a+ δ
a
− f(a) = f(a)δ
a
≤ ε/2 < ε.
We conclude that f is continuous at a.
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2.3 Elastic single-attribute situations and associated games
In elastic single-attribute situations, every player is associated with a certain resource
endowment—his attribute, described by a positive real number. These endowments can be
pooled to attain cost savings, as described by a non-decreasing, elastic cost function.
Definition 2.2. An elastic single-attribute situation is a triple (N, K̃, λ), where
• N is a non-empty, finite set of players;
• K̃ is a non-decreasing, elastic function mapping R+ to R+;
• λ is an element of RN++.
The function K̃ expresses the costs to serve any level of attributes. The requirement
that K̃ is non-decreasing is imposed to highlight the applications that we have in mind: in
these applications, K̃ expresses the costs to serve any level of demand in a service system,
and such a cost does not shrink as demand increases. The vector λ represents the attributes
of the various players; we will systematically write λM =
∑
i∈M λi for any M ⊆ N . The
set of all elastic single-attribute situations with finite but variable N is denoted by E .
An elastic single-attribute situation naturally leads to a corresponding game.
Definition 2.3. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) be an elastic single-attribute situation. The game
(N, cϕ) defined by cϕ(M) = K̃(λM) for M ⊆ N is called the associated single-attribute
game.
We are interested in rules that assign to any elastic single-attribute situation an allo-
cation for the associated single-attribute game.
Definition 2.4. An allocation rule on elastic single-attribute situations (or rule for short)
is a mapping F on E such that for every (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E it holds that F (N, K̃, λ) ∈ RN
and that
∑
i∈N Fi(N, K̃, λ) = K̃(λN).
Allocation rules can satisfy various interesting properties. We next define one such
property.
Definition 2.5. A rule F on E is said to have the coalitional rationality property (CR) if
F (ϕ) ∈ C(N, cϕ) for any elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, λ, K̃).
Coalitional rationality says that a rule should always generate a core element for the
associated single-attribute game. If players can freely form coalitions (e.g., if they could
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either use dedicated resources to serve their own demands, or set up a joint facility with
pooled resources to serve several players together) then coalitional rationality will be an
important property.
A simple rule, which is often referred to as “average pricing” in the cost sharing litera-
ture (e.g., Moulin and Shenker, 1992; Sudhölter, 1998), is to assign the costs of the grand
coalition proportional to the attributes of the individual players.
Definition 2.6. The proportional rule P on E is defined by allocating Pi(N, K̃, λ) =
K̃(λN) · λi/λN to player i ∈ N in situation (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E .
The following theorem states that the proportional rule always yields core allocations.
It is due to Özen et al. (2011).
Theorem 2.3. The proportional rule P satisfies the coalitional rationality property.
We remark that this theorem implies that all single-attribute games have core elements.
Accordingly, they represent a subclass of the class of games with non-empty cores. In a
recent paper, Anily and Haviv (2014) detail various other classes of games with non-empty
cores; none of them coincide with the class of single-attribute games.
We next present four illustrative examples, all based on collaboration in canonical
queueing or inventory models, to indicate the wide applicability of the class of elastic
single-attribute situations.
Example 2.3. (Erlang loss games) Consider a set N of players (e.g., hospital de-
partments) who require servers (e.g., beds) to serve randomly arriving customers (e.g.,
patients). Customer arrivals for any player i ∈ N are governed by a Poisson process with
rate λi > 0. If a customer finds a free server upon arrival, then he immediately goes into
service, which takes one unit of time on average. If a customer finds no free server upon
arrival, then he is blocked and lost to the system. The players may collaborate by pooling
servers: any coalition will set up a shared service facility which, due to the blocking of
customers, will behave as an M/G/s/s queue (also known as Erlang loss system) and in
which a number of servers is used that minimizes the long-term average costs per time unit.
We consider resource costs h > 0 per server and penalty costs p > 0 per lost customer.
We can capture this situation as an elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ)




for all ` > 0, where B(s, `) = [`s/s!]/[
∑s
y=0 `
y/y!] represents the steady-state probability
that an arriving customer is lost in an Erlang loss system with s servers and arrival rate
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`. As shown in Özen et al. (2011), the function K̃ is non-decreasing and elastic, so this
is indeed an elastic single-attribute situation. Hence, by Theorem 2.3, the proportional
allocation P(ϕ) is a coalitionally rational allocation for the associated single-attribute
game (N, cϕ). This result was also derived by Karsten et al. (2014) using an alternative
proof. ♦
Example 2.4. (EOQ games) Consider a set N of players (e.g., retailers) who have to
meet deterministic demand for items (e.g., office supplies) occurring at a constant rate.
The demand rate for any player i ∈ N is λi ≥ 0 items per unit of time. For any order that
is placed, a fixed ordering cost a > 0 is incurred. Furthermore, there are holding cost of
h > 0 per item on stock per unit of time. The players in a coalition may save on the fixed
ordering costs by ordering jointly: they will use an optimal joint replenishment policy that
meets all of their demands at minimal total average costs per time unit.
We can capture this situation as an elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with
K̃(`) =
√
2ah` for all ` ≥ 0. Here, K̃ follows from the basic Economic Order Quantity
model. Clearly, K̃ is concave, hence elastic, and non-decreasing. So, by Theorem 2.3, the
proportional allocation P(ϕ) is coalitionally rational. Meca et al. (2004) obtained the
same conclusion via a different approach. ♦
Example 2.5. (Spare parts games) Consider a set N of players (e.g., airlines) who face
demands for a low-demand, expensive item (e.g., a spare airplane part). Demands for any
player i ∈ N are governed by a Poisson process with rate λi > 0. Because the item is
expensive and infrequently demanded, a base-stock policy with one-for-one replenishments
is followed. A coalition of players may collaborate by pooling inventory: they will set
up a shared stockpoint which, due to the one-for-one replenishments, will behave as an
(S − 1, S) inventory system and in which a base stock level is used that minimizes the
long-term average costs per time unit. We consider holding costs h > 0 per unit time per
item in the on-hand stock and penalty costs b > 0 per unit time per backordered demand.
We can capture this situation as an elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ)
where the cost function K̃ : R+ → R+ is defined by K̃(0) = 0 and
K̃(`) = min
s∈{0,1,...}
{hEI(S, `) + bEB(S, `)}
for all ` > 0, where EI(S, `) and EB(S, `) represent the expected stock on hand and the
expected backorders, respectively, for an (S−1, S) inventory system with base stock level S
and demand rate ` in steady state. As shown in Karsten and Basten (2014), the function K̃
is non-decreasing and elastic, so this is indeed an elastic single-attribute situation. Hence,
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by Theorem 2.3, the proportional allocation P(ϕ) is a coalitionally rational allocation for
the associated single-attribute game (N, cϕ). They also discussed how this property could
be derived from a link with newsvendor games. ♦
Example 2.6. (Call center games) Consider a set N of players (e.g., call centers) who
require staff (e.g., agents) to serve large populations of customers (e.g., calls). Customer
arrivals for any player i ∈ N are governed by a Poisson process with rate λi > 0. Service
times are exponentially distributed and take one unit of time on average. There is infinite
queueing room, and we consider linear staffing and waiting costs. Because arrival rates
are large, the (close-to-optimal) square-root safety staffing principle is used to determine
staffing levels. The players may collaborate by pooling servers: a coalition will set up a
shared service facility that serves the union of their customer streams.
We can capture this situation as an elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with
K̃(`) = ` + β
√
`, where β > 0 is a parameter that depends on the staffing and waiting
costs. Here, K̃ expresses the staffing levels according to the square-root safety staffing
principle. Clearly, K̃ is concave, hence elastic, and non-decreasing. So, by Theorem 2.3,
the proportional allocation P(ϕ) is coalitionally rational. The corollary that the associated
single-attribute game (N, cϕ) has a non-empty core was also obtained by Guo et al. (2013),
and the result is in line with the finding of Karsten et al. (2015) that when M/M/s queues
join forces under optimized real-valued number of servers, the corresponding game in their
model admits a proportional core allocation. ♦
3 An impossibility result
In the previous section, we saw that the proportional rule P satisfies the appealing coali-
tional rationality property. In this section, we start by using an example to indicate a
disadvantage of P.
Example 3.1. Suppose that player 1 (with a montly demand rate of 9) and player 2 (with
a monthly demand rate of 16) aim to set up a joint service system, whose total monthly
costs increase concavely according to the square root of the total demand rate served. This
may be modeled via the elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with N = {1, 2},
λ1 = 9, λ2 = 16, and K̃(`) =
√
` for all ` ∈ R+. The single-attribute game associated with
this situation, (N, cϕ), is given by cϕ({1}) = 3, cϕ({2}) = 4, and cϕ(N) = 5.
Clearly, P1(ϕ) = 5 · 9/25 = 9/5 and P2(ϕ) = 5 · 16/25 = 16/5. This means that
the cost savings allocated to player 1 by the proportional rule, cϕ({1}) −P1(ϕ) = 6/5,
are larger than the cost savings allocated to player 2, cϕ({2}) −P2(ϕ) = 4/5. So, even
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though collaboration under P does in fact produce a small saving for player 2, his cost
savings are less than those of player 1. One could argue that this is unfair because the
total savings were only made possible because player 2 allowed player 1 to piggyback on
his large attribute. ♦
Similar objections have been observed in practice by Frisk et al. (2010) when trying
to implement cost allocation rules for collaborative forest transportation. They found
that when relative savings were dissimilar (as is the case when small players reap more
benefits than large players) the cost allocations were difficult to accept by the participating
companies.
The following definition formalizes the idea that an allocation rule should avoid the
issue described in Example 3.1.
Definition 3.1. A rule F on E is said to have the benefit ordering property (BO) if, for
every elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) and every i, j ∈ N with λi ≤ λj, we
have that cϕ({i})−Fi(ϕ) ≤ cϕ({j})−Fj(ϕ).
Benefit ordering means that a player with a larger attribute should always reap at least
as much benefit from the collaboration as a player with a smaller attribute. Here, “benefit”
refers to cost savings.
As shown in Example 3.1, the proportional rule does not satisfy the benefit ordering
property. However, by Theorem 2.3, the proportional rule does satisfy the coalitional
rationality property. A natural follow-up question is whether there is a rule on E that
satisfies both the benefit ordering property and the coalitional rationality property. The
following example, however, shows that such a rule does not exist: no rule on E can satisfy
both CR and BO simultaneously.
Example 3.2. Consider the elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with N =
{1, 2, 3}, λ1 = λ2 = 2.5, λ3 = 5, and cost function K̃ described by
K̃(`) =

0 if ` = 0;
5 if ` ∈ (0, 5];
` if ` > 5.
We have seen that this function is elastic in Example 2.2. For convenience, this function is




5 if |M | = 1 or M = {1, 2};
7.5 if M = {1, 3} or M = {2, 3};
10 if M = N .
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Figure 1: A plot of the function K̃ in Example 3.2.
This game’s core has only one element: C(N, cϕ) = {(2.5, 2.5, 5)}.2 The benefits for player
3 under the core allocation are zero, while the benefits to players 1 and 2 are (strictly)
positive. Since the attributes of players 1 and 2 are smaller than the attribute of player 3,
we conclude that any rule satisfying the coalitional rationality property cannot satisfy the
benefit ordering property since it must select the unique core element for this game.3 ♦
Example 3.2 shows that the properties CR and BO are incompatible on E . If we want
to arrive at properties that are compatible, then we have to relax some of our requirements.
The following two definitions propose relaxations of CR and BO, respectively.
Definition 3.2. A rule F is said to have the individual rationality property (IR) on E if
F (ϕ) ∈ I(N, cϕ) for any elastic single-attribute situation ϕ.
Definition 3.3. A rule F on E is said to have the benefit ordering property under concavity
(BOC) if, for every elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with concave K̃ and
every i, j ∈ N with λi ≤ λj, we have that cϕ({i})−Fi(ϕ) ≤ cϕ({j})−Fj(ϕ).
2To see this, first note that (2.5, 2.5, 5) is a core allocation, so the core is non-empty. Let x be a
core allocation. This implies that x3 ≤ c({3}) = 5, x1 + x2 ≤ c({1, 2}) = 5, and x1 + x2 + x3 = 10,
which together yield x3 = x1 + x2 = 5. Coalitional rationality of x in combination with x3 = 5 yields
x1 ≤ cϕ({1, 3})− x3 = 2.5 and x2 ≤ cϕ({1, 3})− x3 = 2.5. But since we established that x1 + x2 = 5, we
must have x1 = x2 = 2.5.
3The same incompatibility would occur if, e.g., K̃(`) =
√
5` on [0, 5]. The discontinuity of the cost
function at 0 in the example does not drive the incompatibility; it is merely for expositional ease.
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It is easy to see that CR implies IR and that BO implies BOC. Indeed, CR extends
the rationality requirement of IR from single players to coalitions, and BO extends the
ordering requirement of BOC from concave cost functions to arbitrary non-decreasing,
elastic cost functions. These relaxations help to illustrate the extent to which CR and BO
are incompatible. In Section 5, we construct a rule on E satisfying both IR and BO. In
Section 6, we construct a rule on E satisfying both CR and BOC.
We remark that in many situations, such as in Examples 2.4 and 2.6, the cost function
is concave. However, even in such concave situations, the proportional rule P is not
guaranteed to dish out larger benefits to larger players, as shown in Example 3.1. This
implies that P does not satisfy BOC. Accordingly, a rule that does satisfy BOC can be
rightfully said to do “better” than P with regard to the ordering of players’ benefits. In
the next three sections, we introduce several new rules and analyze their properties.
4 The serial rule
Elastic single-attribute situations have the same mathematical structure as so-called cost
sharing situations, which are well-studied in the literature. Indeed, a cost sharing situation
is a tuple (N, q, C), with a given set N = {1, . . . , n} of users, user i having demand qi ∈ R+,
who share a joint production process described by a cost function C : R+ → R+. The
argument of C is interpreted as the sum of demands to be served.
There are two key differences, however. First, in contrast to elastic single-attribute
situations, the cost function C is not required to be elastic. Second, the typical story
behind cost sharing situations differs from our elastic single-attribute situations. In a
cost sharing situation (as studied in, e.g., Moulin and Shenker, 1992) there is only one
production process that is jointly owned by all the players, and they are basically forced to
collaborate with each other—no group of users can get their desired output if they split off
and act independently. In an elastic single-attribute situation, collaboration via resource
pooling is optional—any coalition might set up a separate service system if they so please.
This different interpretation means that certain considerations which are natural for elastic
single-attribute situations, such as individual rationality or stability, do not apply to cost
sharing situations.
The literature on cost sharing situations, however, contains interesting cost sharing
mechanisms. We translate the serial rule (Moulin and Shenker, 1992), one of the most-
studied mechanisms, to a rule on E . This rule takes into account some of the intermediate
behavior of the cost function, as opposed to the proportional rule which entirely ignores
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the behavior of the cost function between zero and the total demand of the grand coalition.
Definition 4.1. The serial rule S on E is defined by allocating




|N |+ 1− j
to player i ∈ N in the elastic single-attribute situation (N, K̃, λ), where σ is an ordering
on N such that λσ−1(1) ≤ λσ−1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λσ−1(|N |), which orders the players from small to
large attributes4, where Λ0 = 0, and where




for any j ∈ {1, . . . , |N |}. Note that 0 < Λ1 ≤ Λ2 ≤ . . . ≤ Λ|N |.
To illustrate, suppose for notational ease that N = {1, 2, . . . , n} and that λ1 ≤ λ2 ≤
. . . ≤ λn. Then, serial cost sharing says that player 1, with the lowest attribute λ1, pays
(1/n)th of the cost of Λ1 = nλ1, i.e., the total costs if everyone would have player 1’s
attribute. Player 2, with the next lowest attribute λ2, pays player 1’s cost share plus
1/(n− 1)th of the incremental cost from Λ1 = nλ1 to Λ2 = (n− 1)(λ2 − λ1) + nλ1, i.e., to
the total costs if everyone except for player 1 would have player 2’s attribute. Player 3, with
the next lowest attribute λ3, pays player 2’s cost share, plus 1/(n−2)th of the incremental
cost from Λ2 = (n− 1)(λ2 − λ1) + nλ1 to Λ3 = (n− 2)(λ3 − λ2) + (n− 1)(λ2 − λ1) + nλ1.
And so on.
The following theorem deals with two properties of the serial rule S .
Theorem 4.1. The serial rule S on E satisfies the individual rationality property and the
benefit ordering property under concavity.
Proof. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E . Without loss of generality, assume for notational conve-
4If several players have the same attribute, then all such orderings lead to the same allocation.
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· λi = cϕ({i}),
where both inequalities hold by elasticity of K̃. In the first inequality, we use that
Λi ≥ max{Λi−1, λi}, while Λj ≤ max{Λi−1, λi} for any j ∈ {1, . . . , i − 1}. In the sec-
ond inequality, we use that λi ≤ max{Λi−1, λi}. We conclude that S (ϕ) ∈ I(N, cϕ).
To study benefit ordering under concavity, assume that K̃ is concave. Suppose that
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1}. By assumption, λi ≤ λi+1. It suffices to prove that cϕ({i})−Si(ϕ) ≤
cϕ({i+ 1})−Si+1(ϕ). To this end, we first derive that
K̃(λi+1)− K̃(λi) =
K̃(λi + λi+1 − λi)− K̃(λi)
λi+1 − λi




Λi + (n− i)(λi+1 − λi)
)
− K̃(Λi)
(n− i)(λi+1 − λi)












where the inequality holds because K̃ is concave and thus the difference quotient obtained
when adding an amount (in particular, λi+1−λi) to λi is at least as large as the difference
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quotient obtained when adding an amount (in particular, (n − i)(λi+1 − λi)) to Λi, since
λi ≤ Λi.

















We conclude that S satisfies the benefit ordering property under concavity.
The following example shows that S neither satisfies the coalitional rationality property
nor the benefit ordering property.
Example 4.1. Consider the single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with N = {1, 2, 3},
λ1 = 1, λ2 = 4, λ3 = 5, and the elastic, but not concave, cost function K̃ as in Example
3.2. The associated single-attribute game (N, cϕ) is given by
cϕ(M) =
{
5 if |M | = 1;∑
i∈M λi otherwise.
The serial rule allocates S1(ϕ) = K̃(3)/3 = 5/3, S2(ϕ) = K̃(3)/3 + (K̃(9) − K̃(3))/2 =
11/3, and S3(ϕ) = 14/3. Since S1(ϕ) + S2(ϕ) = 16/3 > 5 = cϕ({1, 2}), we conclude that
S (ϕ) /∈ C(N, cϕ). Hence, S does not satisfy the coalitional rationality property.
Furthermore, since cϕ({1}) − S1(ϕ) = 10/3 and cϕ({2}) − S2(ϕ) = 4/3, player 1
obtains a larger cost saving than player 2, which implies that S does not satisfy the
benefit ordering property either. ♦
We conclude that S satisfies IR and BOC, but lacks CR and BO.
5 The benefit-proportional rule
Our next alternative allocation rule is a variation on the proportional rule. Rather than
allocating the total costs proportional to the attribute of each player, we allocate the
benefits proportionally instead.
16





· λi/λN to player i ∈ N in (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E .
The following example illustrates this rule and shows that it does not satisfy the coali-
tional rationality property.
Example 5.1. Reconsider the single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) of Example 3.2.
The allocation of the benefit-proportional rule B(ϕ), which is given by (3.75, 3.75, 2.5),
differs from the unique core allocation, (2.5, 2.5, 5); hence B(ϕ) is not in the core of the
associated single-attribute game. This implies that it does not satisfy the coalitional ra-
tionality property. ♦
The following theorem deals with two more properties.
Theorem 5.1. The benefit-proportional rule B satisfies the benefit ordering property and
the individual rationality property.




























where the inequality holds because λi ≤ λj. Hence, B satisfies BO. Furthermore, B
satisfies IR because
∑
j∈N K̃(λj) ≥ K̃(λN) by Theorem 2.3; hence, by definition, Bi(ϕ) ≤
cϕ({i}) for each i ∈ N .
Hence, B shows that the properties IR and BO are compatible.
6 Concavicated marginal rules
This section introduces and analyzes two new rules on elastic single-attribute situations:
the concavicated increasing marginal rule and the concavicated average marginal rule. Sec-
tion 6.1 focuses on marginal allocations and the Shapley value in single-attribute situations
with concave cost functions. Section 6.2 describes how to construct an order-specific con-
cave function under an elastic function. Section 6.3 defines the two concavicated rules and
analyzes their properties.
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6.1 Concave single-attribute situations
This subsection considers single-attribute situations with concave cost functions. For the
corresponding single-attribute games, we will study marginal allocations and the Shapley
value. We remark that these are rules for games, not on elastic single-attribute situations.
We start with a simple preliminary result.
Lemma 6.1. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) be a single-attribute situation with concave K̃. Then,
(i) (N, cϕ) is concave.
(ii) For all orderings σ on N , mσ(N, cϕ) ∈ C(N, cϕ).
(iii) Φ(N, cϕ) ∈ C(N, cϕ).
Proof. (i). Let i ∈ N and let M,L ⊆ N \ {i} with M ⊆ L. Then,
cϕ(M ∪ {i})− cϕ(M) = K̃(λM + λi)− K̃(λM)
≥ K̃(λM + λL\M + λi)− K̃(λM + λL\M)
= cϕ(L ∪ {i})− cϕ(L),
where the inequality holds because K̃ is concave. This means that (N, cϕ) is concave.
(ii). Follows from Part (i) since, by Shapley (1971), any marginal vector is in the core
of a concave game.
(iii). Follows from Part (ii) since the Shapley value is the average of the marginal
vectors and the core is a convex set.
We next describe a restriction on orderings.
Definition 6.1. Given an elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E , the set Θ(ϕ)
is defined as the set of all orderings on N for which players are ordered in non-decreasing
order of their attributes, i.e., Θ(ϕ) = {σ ∈ Π(N) | λσ−1(1) ≤ λσ−1(2) ≤ . . . ≤ λσ−1(|N |)}.
The following theorem considers such orderings and states that, under any correspond-
ing marginal allocation, the players’ benefits will be ordered in the same way as their
attributes.
Theorem 6.2. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) be a single-attribute situation with concave K̃. Let
σ ∈ Θ(ϕ). Then, cϕ({i}) − mσi (N, cϕ) ≤ cϕ({j}) − mσj (N, cϕ) for each i, j ∈ N with
σ(i) ≤ σ(j).
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Table 1: All marginal allocations and their average for the game in Example 6.1.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ N with σ(i) ≤ σ(j), which implies that λi ≤ λj. Then,
cϕ({i})−mσi (N, cϕ) = cϕ({i})− c(P σi ∪ {i}) + c(P σi )
= K̃(λi)− K̃(λPσi + λi) + K̃(λPσi )
≤ K̃(λi + (λj − λi))− K̃(λPσi + λi + (λj − λi)) + K̃(λPσi )
≤ K̃(λi + (λj − λi))− K̃(λPσj + λi + (λj − λi)) + K̃(λPσj )
= cϕ({j})−mσj (N, cϕ).
The first inequality holds because K̃ is concave and λj ≥ λi. The second inequality holds
because K̃ is concave and, since σ(i) ≤ σ(j) in the ordering, P σi ⊆ P σj .
The following example provides an illustration and shows that a marginal allocation
need not assign the same costs to players with identical attributes.
Example 6.1. Consider the elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with N =
{1, 2, 3}, λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1, λ3 = 2, and K̃(`) =
√
` for all ` ∈ R+. Note that K̃ is concave.
The associated single-attribute game (N, cϕ) is described by
cϕ(M) =

1 if M = {1} or M = {2};√
2 if M = {1, 2} or M = {3};√
3 if M = {1, 3} or M = {2, 3};
2 if M = N .
This game is concave. All marginal allocations and their average (i.e., the Shapley value)
for this game are described in Table 1. Note that they are in the core of (N, cϕ).
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The set Θ(ϕ) contains two orderings: one whose inverse is (1, 2, 3) and one whose
inverse is (2, 1, 3). Let us consider the first-mentioned one and denote it by σ. So, in first
position is player 1, in second position is player 2, and in third position is player 3. The
marginal allocation mσ(N, cϕ) according to this ordering is given by (1,
√
2 − 1, 2 −
√
2).
Note that even though players 1 and 2 have identical attributes, they get a different cost
assignment. Due to the ordering, player 1’s benefit of cϕ({1}) −mσ1 (N, cϕ) = 0 is smaller
than player 2’s benefit of cϕ({2}) − mσ2 (N, cϕ) = 2 −
√
2, which in turn is smaller than
player 3’s benefit of cϕ({3})−mσ3 (N, cϕ) = 2
√
2− 2. ♦
This example raises the issue that a marginal allocation corresponding to an ordering in
Θ(ϕ) may treat identical players differently. This can be avoided by averaging over Θ(ϕ),
as shown in the following theorem.












for each i, j ∈ N with λi ≤ λj.
Proof. Let i, j ∈ N with λi ≤ λj. We distinguish between two cases.
Case 1: λi < λj. Then, σ(i) < σ(j) for each σ ∈ Θ(ϕ). The desired inequality then
holds by Theorem 6.2.
Case 2: λi = λj. Then, obviously, c
ϕ({i}) = cϕ({j}). Moreover, players i and j are
symmetric, and thus for every ordering σ̌ ∈ Θ(ϕ) with σ̌(i) = a and σ̌(j) = b there exists
another ordering σ̂ ∈ Θ(ϕ) with σ̂(i) = b, σ̂(j) = a, and σ̂(k) = σ(k) for all k ∈ N \ {i, j}.
For these orderings, mσ̌i (N, c












Hence, the desired inequality holds with equality.
Remarkably, the average of all marginal allocations (i.e., the Shapley value) also has
the players’ benefits ordered in the same way as their attributes.
Theorem 6.4. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E with concave K̃. Then,
cϕ({i})− Φi(N, cϕ) ≤ cϕ({j})− Φj(N, cϕ)
for each i, j ∈ N with λi ≤ λj.
Proof. Define α(M) = (|M |)! · (|N | − |M | − 1)! for all M ⊂ N . This number α(M)
may be interpreted as follows: given a fixed player k ∈ N \M , α(M) is the number of
20
different orderings of N where positions 1 through |M | are are taken by players in M ,
position |M |+ 1 is taken by player k, and any remaining positions are taken by players in
N \ (M ∪ {k}). So,
∑
M⊆N\{k} α(M) = |N |! for all k ∈ N . Note that α(M) depends on M
only through M ’s cardinality.












































































































cϕ(M ∪ {j})− cϕ(M)
)
= cϕ({j})− Φj(N, cϕ),
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where both inequalities hold by concavity of K̃. In the first inequality, we use that λi ≤ λj.
In the second inequality, we also use K̃(λM −λj +λj)− K̃(λj) ≤ K̃(λM −λj +λi)− K̃(λi),
which implies that K̃(λi) + K̃(λM) ≤ K̃(λj) + K̃(λM − λj + λi).
The following example provides an illustration of Theorems 6.3 and 6.4.













allocation, the benefit to player 1, 1− 1
2
√
2 ≈ 0.29, is the same as the benefit to player 2,
which in turn is smaller than the benefit to player 3, 2
√
2− 2 ≈ 0.83.
















1. Under the Shapley value, the benefit to player 1, cϕ({1})−Φ1(N, cϕ) = 16(1+
√
3) ≈ 0.46,
is the same as the benefit to player 2, which in turn is smaller than the benefit to player






3) ≈ 0.50. ♦
We now know that when the cost function is concave, players with larger attributes
get larger benefits under the Shapley value. Since the Shapley value is the average of all
marginal vectors, a natural question is whether or not this result extends to all marginal
vectors. The following example shows that this is not the case.
Example 6.3. Reconsider the elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) of Example
6.1. Consider the ordering σ on N described by σ−1 = (3, 2, 1). So, player 3 is in first
position, player 2 is in second position, and player 1 is in last position. The marginal









that cϕ({1})−mσ1 (N, cϕ) = −1 +
√
3 > 0 = cϕ({3})−mσ3 (N, cϕ) even though λ1 < λ3. ♦
Marginal allocations for single-attribute games are not guaranteed to be coalitionally
rational if the cost function is merely elastic (as opposed to concave). Indeed, as shown
in Karsten and Basten (2014, Example 5.1), the Shapley value can lie outside the core in
such a case. In the remainder, we aim to remedy this.
6.2 Concave functions under elastic functions
The preceding subsection focused on concave cost functions. We now return to elastic cost
functions. Given the positive results of Theorems 6.3 and 6.4 for concave cost functions, we
will propose a number of ways—one per ordering of the players—to approximate an elastic
function with a concave function. As we will show, if this is done in a proper way, then
marginal allocations for the single-attribute games induced by these concave functions can
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yield allocations for the original game that retain the nice properties of their concavicated
counterparts.
Any marginal allocation depends on the cost function only through the value of that
function at |N | distinct arguments, and we will construct a concave function that approx-
imates the original elastic function as closely as possible at these |N | arguments. These
arguments may differ across marginal allocations. However, no marginal allocation de-
pends on the cost function beyond the maximum argument λN , which allows us to restrict
ourselves to constructing a function with domain [0, λN ]. Hence, we will construct a con-
cave function on [0, λN ] for every possible ordering of the players. This function will be
made up of straight, consecutive line segments.
Definition 6.2. For any λ, µ, q, r ∈ R+ with λ < µ and q ≤ r, we define the function
L
(µ,r)






(x− µ) + r for all x ∈ R .
This function represents the straight line through the points (λ, q) and (µ, r).
We next describe how to draw an order-specific concave function under an elastic func-
tion. Figure 2 may prove helpful as an illustration.
Procedure 6.1. Let (N, K̃, λ) be an elastic single-attribute situation and let σ be an
ordering on N . For notational ease, write n = |N |. Define Λσ0 = 0 and Λσi = λσ−1(1) + . . .+
λσ−1(i) for all i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. Note that Λn = λN . We now aim to construct a continuous











such that the resulting function is non-negative, concave, non-decreasing, and not above




1 , . . . , Q
σ
n.
We start from the right and set Qσn = K̃(Λ
σ
n). We then fix Q
σ
n−1 by drawing the






n−1) that is not above K̃ on the interval
[Λσn−1,Λ
σ














] ∣∣∣L(Λσn,Qσn)(Λσn−1,q)(`) ≤ K̃(`) ∀ ` ∈ [Λσn−1,Λσn]} .
The number Qσn−1 is well-defined because K̃ is elastic.
5





then the resulting line is not above K̃ on [Λσn−1,Λ
σ
n] by Proposition 2.2. The maximum actually exists
because if n > 1 then K̃ is continuous on [Λσn−1,Λ
σ
n] by Proposition 2.2; otherwise, if n = 1 then Q0 = 0
because the interval from which we are to pick q only includes 0.
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Figure 2: The function K̃ from Example 6.4 and a σ-concavication (dashed).
For j ∈ {0, . . . , n − 2}, recursively, we then fix Qσj by drawing the highest possible






























] ∣∣∣L(Λσj+1,Qσj+1)(Λσj ,q) (`) ≤ K̃(`) ∀ ` ∈ [Λσj ,Λσj+1]} .
The number Qσj is well-defined because, again, K̃ is elastic.
6
Given the numbersQσ0 , Q
σ
1 , . . . , Q
σ
n as defined above, the σ-concavication K̃
conc
σ : [0, λN ]→
R+ is given by







(`) for j ∈ {1, . . . , n} with ` ∈ [Λσj−1,Λσj ].
for all ` ∈ (0, λN ] and K̃concσ (0) = 0.
6The set over which we take the maximum is non-empty, for two reasons. First, the interval from which










(0,0) is steeper than L
(Λj+2,Qj+2)
(Λj+1,Qj+1)
. Second, by construction, Qσj+1 ≤ K̃(Λσj+1); hence,









which in turn is not above K̃ by Proposition 2.2. The maximum actually exists because if j ≥ 1 then K̃
is continuous on [Λσn−1,Λ
σ
n] by Proposition 2.2; otherwise, if j = 0 then K̃(0) = 0 implies Qj = 0.
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The following lemma collects several properties of a σ-concavication that follow directly
from its definition.
Lemma 6.5. Let (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E, and let σ be an ordering on N .
(i) K̃concσ is concave.
(ii) K̃concσ (`) ≤ K̃(`) for all ` ∈ [0, λN) and K̃concσ (λN) = K̃(λN).
(iii) If K̃ is concave, then K̃concσ (Λ
σ
i ) = K̃(Λ
σ
i ) for all i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , n}.
(iv) K̃concσ (0) = 0.
The following example illustrates the construction of a σ-concavication.
Example 6.4. Consider the single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) with N = {1, 2, 3},
λ1 = 1, λ2 = 1.5, λ3 = 2.5, and elastic cost function K̃ equal to the function considered
in Example 3.2, which is for convenience represented again in Figure 2. For the ordering
σ with σ−1 = (1, 2, 3), the σ-concavication K̃concσ : [0, 5] → R corresponding to attribute
vector λ is given by
K̃concσ (`) =
{
5` if ` ∈ [0, 1];
5 if ` ∈ (1, 5].
See Figure 2. For other orderings, the construction is similar. ♦
The following example illustrates the construction of a σ-concavication for a more
complicated situation.
Example 6.5. Consider the elastic single-attribute situation (N, K̃, λ) with N = {1, 2, 3},
λ1 = 1, λ2 = 4, λ3 = 6, and cost function K̃ : R+ → R+ defined by
K̃(`) =

4` if ` ∈ [0, 1];
4 if ` ∈ (1, 3];
2 + ` · 2/3 if ` ∈ (3, 6];
6 + ((`− 6)/4)2 if ` ∈ (6, 10];
7 if ` > 10;
This function and each of its σ-concavications are graphically represented in Figure 3. The
function K̃ is elastic because
• for ` on (0, 1], K̃(`)/` = 4;
• for ` on (1, 3], K̃(`)/` = 4/` is decreasing in ` and ranges from 4 to 4/3;
• for ` on (3, 6], K̃(`)/` = 2/3 + 2/` is decreasing in ` and ranges from 4/3 to 1;
25
Figure 3: The function K̃ from Example 6.5 and all its σ-concavications (dashed).
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• for ` on (6, 10], K̃(`)/` = 6/`+ (`−12 + 36/`)/16 is decreasing7 in ` and ranges from
1 to 7/10;
• for ` > 10, K̃(`)/` = 7/` is decreasing in ` with a maximal value of 7/10.
We illustrate the construction of a σ-concavication for two orderings. First, consider
the ordering σ with σ−1 = (2, 3, 1). So, player 2 is in first position, player 3 is in second
position, and player 1 is in third position. Hence, Λσ1 = 4, Λ
σ
2 = 10, and Λ
σ
3 = 11.
Obviously, Qσ3 = 7, Q
σ
2 = 7, and Q
σ
0 = 0. Consider Q
σ
1 , i.e., the largest q ≤ K̃(Λσ1 ) = 423
such that L
(10,7)
(4,q) (`) ≤ K̃(`) for all ` ∈ [4, 10]. Since the derivative of 6 + ((` − 6)/4)2
evaluated at ` = 10 is equal to 0.5, any q > K̃(Λσ2 ) − 0.5 · (Λσ2 − Λσ1 ) = 4 would result
in going above the graph of K̃. Yet, q = 4 would not take us above the graph of K̃, so
Qσ1 = 4.
Next, consider the ordering σ with σ−1 = (3, 1, 2). So, player 3 is in first position, player
1 is in second position, and player 2 is in third position. Hence, Λσ1 = 6, Λ
σ
2 = 7, Λ
σ
3 = 11.
Obviously, Qσ3 = 7 and Q
σ
0 = 0. Consider Q
σ
2 , i.e., the largest q ≤ K̃(Λσ2 ) = 6 116 such
that L
(11,7)
(7,q) (`) ≤ K̃(`) for all ` ∈ [7, 11]. For q ∈ [5, 6
1
16
], standard optimization techniques
reveal that 6 + ((`− 6)/4)2 −L(11,7)(7,q) (`) as a function of ` on [7, 11] has a unique minimizer
`∗(q) = 20 − 2q. Consequently, 6 + ((`∗(q) − 6)/4)2 = L(11,7)(7,q) (`∗(q)) if and only if q = 6.
Hence, Qσ2 = 6. Finally, the line L
(11,7)




(7,6) (6) = 5.75.
The construction of the σ-concavication for the other orderings is similar; see Figure
3. ♦
6.3 Two concavicated rules
Based on σ-concavicated situations, we will introduce two new allocation rules on elastic
single-attribute situations.
Definition 6.3. For an elastic single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) and an ordering σ
on N , we call ϕ(σ) = (N, K̃concσ , λ) the corresponding σ-concavicated situation.
We remark that although the domain of K̃concσ is [0, λN ] and not R+, this does not pose
a problem for the two allocation rules that we define next, as they do not depend on the
cost function beyond λN .
Definition 6.4. The concavicated increasing marginal rule M on E assigns to each elastic










































N 11 7 7 7
Table 2: The game and concavicated marginal allocations in Example 6.6.
Definition 6.5. The concavicated average marginal rule A on E assigns to each elastic




The following lemma states that if the cost function is concave, then marginal alloca-
tions are unchanged by concavicated situations.
Lemma 6.6. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) ∈ E with concave K̃.









(iii) A (ϕ) = Φ(N, cϕ).
Proof. For Part (i), let σ ∈ Π(N) and i ∈ N . By Part (iii) of Lemma 6.5, K̃conc(Λσσ(i))−
K̃conc(Λσσ(i)−1) = K̃
conc(λPσi +λi)−K̃








Part (ii) and (iii) follow immediately from Part (i).
The concavicated rules only evaluate a σ-concavication at the arguments Λσ0 , Λ
σ
1 , . . . ,
Λσn. The intermediate behavior of the σ-concavication, however, is still important because it
affects the corresponding game. Despite not taking into account this intermediate behavior,
our concavicated rules still lead to core allocations. Before proving this, we provide an
illustration.
Example 6.6. Reconsider the single-attribute situation ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) from Example 6.5.
The associated single-attribute game (N, cϕ) is described in Table 2. For any ordering σ on
N , the cost function for the corresponding σ-concavicated situation ϕ(σ) = (N, K̃concσ , λ)
is given in Figure 3, and the corresponding marginal allocation is described in Table 3.


































(2,3,1) 0 4 3











Table 3: The marginal allocations corresponding to all σ-concavicated situations in Example 6.6.
marginal allocation A (ϕ) is obtained by averaging all marginal vectors in Table 3, which






). Note that A is not the Shapley value of a “straightforwardly”
derived game because each marginal allocation is based on a different σ-concavicated sit-
uation and thus on a different game.
It is easy to infer from Table 2 that both M (ϕ) and A (ϕ) are core allocations for
(N, cϕ). ♦
Theorem 6.7. Both M and A satisfy the coalitional rationality property on E.
Proof. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) be an elastic single-attribute situation, and let σ be any ordering
on N . Then, by Part (i) of Lemma 6.1, the single-attribute game associated with the


















∈ C(N, cϕ) as well. Since M (ϕ) and A (ϕ) are defined as
averages of marginal allocations for games associated with concavicated situations, their
coalitional rationality is immediate.
Both M and A lack the benefit ordering property because, by Theorem 6.7, they
prescribe the unique core allocation for the situation of Example 3.2, which described our
impossibility result. However, both rules satisfy the relaxation BOC.
Theorem 6.8. Both M and A satisfy the benefit ordering property under concavity.
Proof. Let ϕ = (N, K̃, λ) be any elastic single-attribute situation with concave K̃, and let
σ be any ordering on N . By Part (i) of Lemma 6.5, K̃conc is concave. Hence, Lemma 6.6
applies. Benefit ordering under concavity of M then follows from Theorem 6.3 and from
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Table 4: Overview of the various rules and their properties. Legend for rules: P is the
proportional rule, S is the serial rule, B is the benefit-proportional rule, M is the concavicated
increasing marginal rule, and A is the concavicated average marginal rule. Legend for properties:
CR is the coalitional rational property, IR is the individual rationality property, BO is the benefit
ordering property, and BOC is the benefit ordering property under concavity.
Part (ii) of Lemma 6.6, while benefit ordering under concavity of A follows from Theorem
6.4 and from Part (iii) of Lemma 6.6.
We conclude that both M and A satisfy CR, IR, and BOC, but lack BO.
7 Conclusion
Table 4 presents an overview of our main results. We have shown that coalitional rationality
and benefit ordering are incompatible. At the same time, we have found two rules that
satisfy the combination of coalitional rationality and benefit ordering under concavity: the
concavicated increasing marginal rule M and the concavicated average marginal rule A .
Accordingly, if we desire to improve on the proportional rule with regard to the ordering
of players’ benefits, while keeping coalitional rationality intact, then these rules would be
appealing solutions. Remarkably, A coincides with the Shapley value—one of the most
celebrated solutions for cooperative games—when the cost function is concave. Yet, A
remedies the possible non-stability of the Shapley value when the cost function is merely
elastic.
We conclude by providing four directions for future research. A first direction would be
on alternative concavications. Indeed, the collection of functions described in Procedure 6.1
are not the only concave functions that fit under an elastic function. Although we believe
that Procedure 6.1 is compelling because of the property described in Part (iii) of Lemma
6.5 and because, from a computational perspective, it merely requires the determination
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of |N | straight line segments, future research may look for alternative concavications that
retain these nice properties while additionally being continuous in the attribute vector.
A second direction for future research is on other fairness properties and other allo-
cation rules. There are, of course, many other allocation cost rules possible for elastic
single-attribute situations beyond the ones that we considered. The decreasing serial rule
proposed in de Frutos (1998) or the equal profit method proposed in Frisk et al. (2010)
might be interesting. At the same time, we have not exhausted the list of reasonable
fairness criteria. For example, population monotonicity (cf. Sprumont, 1990) might be
interesting because of the link between elasticity and population monotonicity established
by Özen et al. (2011).
A third possible research direction is on a study of the properties exhibited by rules on
a restricted domain. Indeed, all the properties we have considered deal with the domain
of elastic single-attribute situations. If we would restrict the domain of a rule to a specific
class of situations (e.g., whose cost function represents the optimal costs in an Erlang loss
model as in Example 2.3) then it is possible that a rule would exhibit specific behavior on
that restricted domain.
Finally, it would be valuable to have an axiomatic characterization of some or all of the
allocation rules that we studied in this paper. It would be particularly interesting to see if
the properties that we considered can be used in such a characterization.
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